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Abstract
Vertical pay dispersion (VPD), a hierarchical pay structure used to motivate
employees, has traditionally been studied separately from high-performance
work systems (HPWSs). As a component of HPWSs, incentive-based compensation schemes focus on employee- or team-level incentives. However,
the influence of the simultaneous utilization of VPD and HPWS on performance remains understudied. This study addresses the question of whether
these approaches to managing human capital serve as complements or substitutes to one another. VPD and HPWS are argued to substitute for one another with respect to motivation- and skill-enhancing practices. The opposite notion is true in regard to opportunity-enhancing HPWSs, which serve
to amplify the effectiveness of VPD. In a multisource, longitudinal sample of
South Korean firms, the hypothesized predictions are supported.
Keywords: contingency theory, high-performance work systems, strategic
HRM, tournament theory, vertical pay dispersion
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1 Introduction
Pay dispersion refers to the pattern of pay differential across and
within different levels of the organizational hierarchy (Bloom, 1999;
Bloom & Michel, 2002; Messersmith, Guthrie, Ji, & Lee, 2011; Milkovich
& Newman, 2005). Vertical pay dispersion, in particular, focuses on the
disparity in pay across different levels in the organization (Cowherd &
Levine, 1992; Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 2009). Vertically dispersed pay
structures have received significant criticism in the literature for creating a culture of competition, feelings of relative deprivation (Crosby,
1976), and concern that they suppress teamwork and collaboration
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1988; Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Levine, 1991;
Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). However, VPD also provides tournamenttype payoffs, and the efficacy of such systems is broadly supported in
labor economics (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). In fact, VPD is a viable incentive tool among many firms across multiple sectors and remains an efficacious tool to seek and allocate talent by facilitating sorting among
employees (Gerhart & Fang, 2014). As such, vertically dispersed pay
structures remain the modal system in many industries and organizations (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook & Gangloff, 2014; Conyon, Peck, &
Sadler, 2001; Eriksson, 1999).
In approaching the topic of VPD, we adopt the view espoused by
Shaw (2014) in noting “the legitimacy and justifiability of pay dispersion” (p. 534). Such a view acknowledges that pay dispersion is neither universally beneficial nor detrimental, but that the effect of dispersed pay structures is contingent on a host of internal and external
factors. Therefore, while the theorized organizational benefits of VPD
are contingent upon proper implementation, they are possible given
proper alignment with other system characteristics (Shaw, 2014; Trevor,
Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012).
As firm-level practices, both VPD and HPWSs aim to increase employee ability and motivation, ultimately in an attempt to improve
firm performance. HPWSs also aim to enhance the ability and motivation of human capital while unlocking opportunities for employees to
demonstrate their talent (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000;
Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). HPWSs include a complete menu of
human resource practices ranging from extensive recruitment and
selective staffing to intensive training and development programs,
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performance evaluation, merit-based pay, and employee participation
programs (Huselid, 1995; Takeuchi, Lepak, Wang, & Takeuchi, 2007).
Therefore, HPWSs represent an integrated approach to acquiring and
managing human capital, while VPD focuses on building a promotion
and compensation structure that serves to signal, sort, and incentivize employees, apart from other HRM elements.
This raises a natural question regarding the interplay between
these two sets of practices and whether they enhance or detract from
one another. Although the effects of VPD on performance are mixed
and widely debated, we ask whether HR practices may complement
or hinder the efficacy of VPD in influencing firm performance. Both
VPD and HPWS aim to improve the human capital available to the
firm. VPD focuses on building hierarchical pay structures with strong
incentives for individuals to “compete” for promotions up the organizational ladder, where the gap between pay levels increases disproportionately with each successive promotion. The logic suggests
that steep corporate tournaments attract bright and talented employees who are then motivated to apply their talent in order to receive
substantial rewards as they move up the corporate ladder (Lazear &
Rosen, 1981). Hierarchical pay structures are also viewed as a tool to
efficiently allocate risk. As individuals rise in the hierarchy, they face
greater risk and their compensation is generally more variable. This
allows the organization to shift risk to employees, while also allocating significant rewards to those at the top of the hierarchy who bear
the greatest risk (Nalbantian, Guzzo, Kieffer, & Doherty, 2003).
Bridging the two streams of literature—VPD and HPWSs—we build
upon the growing work in both areas to better understand the relationship between vertically dispersed pay structures and HPWSs. Specifically, we address the theoretical mechanisms through which both
VPD and HPWSs operate to affect performance to determine if VPD
and HPWSs complement one another or substitute for one another.
We specifically note the underlying differences in VPD and HPWS, as
VPD theoretically injects competition within the firm, while HPWSs are
espoused to produce collaboration. We further discuss the redundancies that may be created when simultaneously utilizing VPD and HPWSs. By invoking two systems to achieve one result, the organization
may be creating cost inefficiencies that place it at a competitive disadvantage. We highlight the tension between these two forces both
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theoretically and empirically. Further, the system of high-performance
work practices is decomposed to test the interactive effects of VPD
and skill-, motivation-, and opportunity-enhancing HPWSs on the
above-mentioned performance variables. This is an important area
of inquiry, as many organizations simultaneously leverage hierarchical pay structures and HPWSs. Determining whether this results in an
optimal combination for firm performance is a question of theoretical and practical significance.
This article contributes to the management literature in a number
of ways. Most notably, it builds upon strategic HR research focusing
on the configurational and contingent nature of management practice implementation (Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid & Becker, 2010;
Lepak & Shaw, 2008). While both VPD and HPWSs have been demonstrated to offer beneficial organizational outcomes, they may not
necessarily work well together to produce desired behavioral effects.
Therefore, the article addresses a practically meaningful question in
attempting to understand the challenges associated with integrating
HPWSs into vertically dispersed pay structures. Addressing this tension within the system and untangling the motivational properties of
each add value to the literature and guidance to practice. While existing work has examined the influence of pay dispersion in combination
with other characteristics of the compensation system (Shaw, Gupta,
& Delery, 2002), to our knowledge no study to date has attempted
to disentangle the effects of pay structure choices as combined with
a “typical” HPWS. The results have clear policy implications for firms
seeking to assess gains from a hierarchically dispersed pay structure
and the implementation of other skill-, motivation-, and opportunityenhancing HR practices.
Second, we examine the more nuanced relationships between HPWSs and VPD by investigating the manner in which VPD interacts with
the three subsystems of HPWSs related to skill, motivation, and opportunity enhancement. This provides a more contextualized view of
the relationship between VPD and the key levers and mechanisms
within the HPWS. The results yield important information for both
scholarship and practice as it relates to the implementation of pay
structures and other management practices to achieve higher performance. In doing so, the study also addresses a need for developing
a deeper understanding of the way in which individual HR practices
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interact within the overall system of practices (Lepak & Shaw, 2008)
and examines connections between micro and macro models in the
field of HRM (Wright & Boswell, 2002). In particular, while the organizational sciences have begun to explore the micro-foundations of
competitive advantage (i.e., Abell, Felin, & Foss, 2008; Coff & Kryscynski, 2011), we add to this discussion by looking at the “macrofoundations” of system alignment and fit.
Third, the article tests the propositions using a large, multiyear,
multisource sample of firms across multiple industries in South Korea.
The robustness of the data allows for meaningful comparisons across
organizations and chronological spacing between the measurement
of the independent variables and the dependent variables. While not
conclusive, the evidence provided herein offers guidance to scholars
and practitioners alike.
2 Attracting and Motivating Human Capital: VPD and HPWS
At the root, both work on HPWSs and VPD have emphasized the motivational elements of such practices. Pay dispersion research has typically been built on the theoretical framework of tournament theory.
Tournament theory is a robust theoretical framework (see Connelly
et al., 2014, for a recent review) with an underlying thesis pointing to
the motivational value of disproportionate pay differences in relation
to peers. As such, tournament theory emphasizes the value of steep
pay hierarchies produced through contests in which organizational
actors compete for promotion and rewards (Lazear & Rosen, 1981).
This theory views all promotions within the organization as contests
in which each individual employee is competing with others at their
same level for promotion to the next rung of the corporate ladder. As
one moves up the ladder, rewards become disproportionately greater,
such that the pay increase from Level 2 to Level 3 is greater than from
Level 1 to Level 2, and so on.
Tournament-type pay structures lead to both sorting and incentive
effects (Conyon et al., 2001; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Sorting effects refer to the ability of the firm to attract the best talent possible to the
organization by offering a tournament structure of disproportionately
increasing rewards. Such models argue that the best employees are
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attracted to firms with steep pay structures. Sorting effects also allow
organizations to let go of less valuable human capital as employees
with lower chances of advancing in the tournament leave the firm. The
incentive effect refers to the motivation that all employees enjoy as
they attempt to move up the rungs of the hierarchy (Becker & Huselid,
1992). Tournament theory acknowledges that although the organization is likely paying those at the top of the hierarchy more than their
marginal contribution to the firm, this effect is more than balanced
by the fact that the organization is receiving contributions from lower
level employees that exceed their cost. As aptly put by Lazear (1989,
p. 226), “The salary of the vice president acts not so much as motivation for the vice president as it does as motivation for the assistant
vice presidents.”
In addition, tournament-based pay structures are also viewed as an
efficient mechanism to allocate risk within the organization (Nalbantian et al., 2004). As employees are promoted through the hierarchy,
they generally have greater levels of their compensation put at risk
through incentive-based pay or equity-based pay. Those at the top
tolerate this risk because of the disproportionate increase in the expected value of the reward. Similarly, those at lower rungs often have
less compensation placed at risk, but also have lower potential payouts. As such, risk is shifted from the organization to employees more
efficiently through tournament-based structures to ensure that those
at the top are motivated to achieve firm-level objectives, which will
likely boost their overall compensation package. This is further underscored when relative performance (i.e., performance compared to industry peers) is measured rather than absolute performance, as systemic exogenous risk is shifted to shareholders (or owners) and away
from employees (Haig, Nalbantian, & Zheng, 2004).
VPD, therefore, is viewed as an important tool for motivating employees across the organizational hierarchy to ultimately improve the
financial returns of the firm and to more efficiently allocate risk. Ceteris paribus, the larger the spread between levels, the greater the
motivation for lower level employees to compete for promotions
in an effort to earn the commensurate financial rewards. This effect
has largely been supported in the literature on tournament theory,
both within and outside of the field of management (Connelly et al.,
2014). In fact, a host of studies within this stream of research have
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demonstrated that greater levels of vertical pay dispersion are advantageous to generating financial returns for the organization (Brown,
Sturman, & Simmering, 2003; Ding, Akhtar, & Ge, 2009; Garrett & Gopalakrishna, 2010; Hibbs & Locking, 2000; Kalra & Shi, 2001; Lee, Lev,
& Yao, 2008; Poujol & Tanner, 2010).
Meanwhile, HPWSs have traditionally been defined as a constellation of aligned practices aimed at enhancing the ability and motivation of human resources, while also increasing the opportunities
available to human resources to utilize their talent (Appelbaum et al.,
2000; Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). This ability, motivation, opportunity (AMO) framework is based on the notion of social exchange,
in which human resources seek to match their contributions to the
rewards that they receive (Blau, 1964). This literature has generally
found empirical support for the notion that human resources who
are selected via rigorous selection processes are trained adequately,
provided with development opportunities, given a voice in the organization, and compensated based upon merit will respond with commitment and engagement (Jackson, Schuler, & Rivero, 1989; Messersmith, Patel, Lepak, & Gould-Williams, 2011). Further, such systems
build human and social capital within the firm, thereby leading to improved firm performance (Becker & Huselid, 1998; Combs, Liu, Hall,
& Ketchen, 2006; Huselid & Becker, 2010; Lepak & Snell, 1999). This
literature base has generally found support linking the utilization of
HPWSs in various forms to financial performance (e.g., Combs et al.,
2006; Delery & Shaw, 2001; Huselid, 1995; Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, & Allen, 2005).
2.1 Assessing the Effects of Combining HPWS and VPD
Given these different theoretical approaches to attracting, retaining,
and motivating human capital, it is reasonable to ask how pay dispersion and HPWSs may interact with one another. We argue that
HPWSs and VPD both work to motivate employees, but that the inclusion of HPWS in conjunction with VPD may not be optimal for
boosting firm performance. The distinction between HPWSs and VPD
lies in the underlying theories governing each system. HPWSs tend to
be formulated on the basis of social exchange, providing individuals
with rewards and advancement based on contributions and observed
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performance. Utilizing a system of complementary HR practices is
thought to produce greater levels of human capital in the firm and
also to open avenues for employees to display greater discretionary
effort (Bailey, 1993; Huselid, 1995; Takeuchi et al., 2007). Further, HPWSs tend to be modeled as commitment-based systems, which promote strong psychological ties that are created between the individual and the organization, such that individual and organizational goals
are properly aligned, increasing effort and maximizing the value of human capital (Arthur, 1994; Lepak & Shaw, 2008). Therefore, HPWSs are
largely built on a system of equity in which employees are provided
with tools to enhance their skills and ability, while also being given
opportunities to maximize their own human capital to the betterment
of both the individual and the firm. Such systems tend to be based
on a general sense of fairness and social exchange. If an employee,
individually, performs well, he/she will earn commensurate rewards.
As noted above, the benefit of implementing HPWs is generally
based on building both human capital and social capital. The social
capital aspects may be harmed by the inclusion of tournament structures that promote competition and detract from cooperation in interdependent environments (Becker & Huselid, 1992). In some cases,
competition may create a sense of unfairness relative to others in
the organization that may lead to the deliberate attempt to undermine other team members (Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, & Sanders, 2010;
Lazear, 1989). In many ways, the pay practices typically included in HPWSs are aligned with equity theory (Wallace & Fay, 1983), which presents a compensation model suggesting that individuals compare the
pay they receive to others based on the ratio of inputs/rewards for
each. When the ratio is similar, equity is thought to be present, even
if significant differences exist in absolute compensation.
VPD, on the other hand, is based on the logic of competition,
where small differences in performance lead to significant differences
in compensation and other rewards, all in an effort to optimize performance (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Connelly et al., 2014; Fredrickson
et al., 2010; Heyman, 2005; Main, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1993). VPD places
the emphasis on relative performance rather than absolute performance and sets up competitions across the organization. This means
that employees are motivated to “win” by outperforming peers. Small
increases in performance therefore lead to much greater rewards
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(Connelly et al., 2014). In addition, VPD stands in contrast to equitybased models by explicitly providing individuals at the top of the organizational hierarchy greater rewards than their inputs may warrant.
As a result of these competing logics, we would expect that firms
utilizing HPWSs and VPD simultaneously may see weakened firm financial performance. Utilizing HPWSs is costly, as it requires significant resource commitment and could be difficult to implement across
all employee groups (Huselid & Becker, 2010), especially in smaller or
newer firms (Way, 2002). As such, it is reasonable to expect that including HPWSs and VPD may actually weaken performance because
of the cost associated with full-scale HPWS implementation. While this
cost increase is generally negated by the overall benefit of ability-,
motivation-, and opportunity-enhancement, the competing forces of
VPD and HPWS may partially cancel this effect. Therefore, the firm no
longer reaps the full benefit of dispersed structures.
In sum, the fundamental logic underscoring HPWSs and VPD as
characteristics of an organizational system differs, possibly creating
a suboptimal solution in which one aspect moves employees toward
greater competition (VPD), while the other stresses commitment and
collaboration (HPWS). While each is useful for incentivizing quality
work, the attributes work across purposes, creating a suboptimal result when leveraged simultaneously. Therefore, we test the following:
Hypothesis 1: HPWSs will negatively moderate the relationship
between VPD and organizational performance, such that an increased emphasis on HPWSs dilutes the effectiveness of VPD on
firm performance.
In addition to assessing the utilization of the entire set of practices, it is also important to examine the various components of the
HPWS to determine the detrimental or complementary role that each
may play in the relationship between VPD and firm performance. HPWSs represent a constellation of practices, some of which may operate well in conjunction with a vertically dispersed pay structure, while
others operate across purposes, as noted above. To disentangle these
effects, we follow Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer (2012) in examining the
three subcomponents of the HPWSs: skill-, motivation-, and opportunity-enhancing practices.
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Skill-enhancing practices tend to be focused on building the
knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) of human capital. Typically, practices related to selective staffing and training have been included in
measures of skill-enhancing HPWSs (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012).
Selective staffing involves building extensive recruitment programs to
attract the best talent while also setting up a series of employment
tests to determine the candidate with the best KSA profile to perform a given job. Training, notably, involves identifying deficiencies
in the selected candidates’ KSAs and providing learning and knowledge-acquisition activities in order to ready the individual to perform
the tasks, duties, and responsibilities of the job. Both selective staffing and intensive training are costly approaches to acquiring and selecting human capital. Each requires multiple steps, careful analysis,
and trained evaluators to make decisions.
As noted, VPD builds in sorting effects, in which the best available
talent is thought to seek after organizations with the steepest structures in order to compete for top “prizes” and higher levels of compensation. A vertically dispersed pay structure may produce wage premiums that can effectively eliminate, or at least reduce, the need for
career advancement and internal promotion programs within the firm
(Cappelli & Cascio, 1991). This arises as individuals are naturally incentivized by the pay structure to seek ever increasing rewards, lessening the need for more formal career development programs, job laddering, or other specific internal promotion policies. As Cappelli and
Cascio (1991) note, the wage structure alone may be enough to create the internal labor market, without having to create redundancies
with other HR practices aimed at motivating career advancement and
ensuring a consistent pool of human capital within the firm. As such,
if the sorting effects of a dispersed pay structure are effective, then
adding selective staffing and extensive training opportunities may
actually increase the firm’s cost structure and dilute the benefits of
VPD. We propose that combining skill-enhancing practices with VPD
means that the organization is achieving suboptimal results, because
of the increased costs associated with leveraging two sets of processes aimed at delivering the same results. Rather, firms that are able
to capture the sorting effects of VPD are able to conserve financial resources by not investing as heavily in other skill-enhancing practices.
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Hypothesis 2: Skill-enhancing HPWSs will negatively moderate
the relationship between VPD and organizational performance,
such that an increased emphasis on HPWS dilutes the effectiveness of VPD on firm performance.
Motivation-enhancing practices are those directly aimed at increasing the discretionary effort of employees. Such practices tend to
include utilizing performance evaluation, pay for performance plans,
paying above-market wages, and providing extensive employee benefits (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). The relationship between VPD
and HPWSs is most closely connected at the juncture of rewards and
promotion, which are also core elements of tournament theory. As
such, the relationship is likely to be overlapping and highly contextualized. Many pay systems common to HPWS will likely accentuate the
effectiveness of HPWS. For instance, individual merit-based pay plans
will likely enhance the effectiveness of VPD. Indeed, it is through the
provisions of the merit-based system that the hierarchy is likely established. This will be further accentuated by individual bonus systems that are closely pegged to base salary. As such, individual reward
schemes will likely operate to reinforce the effects of the hierarchical
pay structure.1
However, many of the other motivation-enhancing practices common to HPWSs will likely align orthogonally with VPD. As noted above,
tournament theory postulates that a firm can more efficiently motivate employees by setting up tournaments in which those at the top
are paid disproportionate rewards, thereby inducing those at lower
levels to compete for promotion and advancement. Such pay structures are viewed as economically efficient because a collective group
of employees is being motivated via the pay of a few, rather than motivating on an individual basis (Connelly et al., 2014). As discussed
previously, another notable strength of such systems is the ability to
distribute risk when absolute measures of individual ability are difficult to obtain.
This stands in opposition to motivation-enhancing HPWSs, which
often include provisions for pay-for-performance plans and abovemarket pay level as basic staples (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). The
idea behind pay-for-performance is that individuals are motivated
to produce more if they are paid directly based on how much they
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produce for the organization (Deckop, Mangel, & Cirka, 1999; Oliver
& Anderson, 1995). The literature has generally found this link to hold
in organizations (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1988; Rynes, Gerhart,
& Parks, 2005); however, it creates greater expense for the firm. Rather
than paying only a handful of organizational actors above their marginal contribution to the firm, the firm pays all employees in accordance with the firm’s pay policy. While dispersed pay structures that
are based on pay-for-performance tend to promote a sense of equity
among employees and have been demonstrated to lead to better individual performance (Shaw et al., 2002), the use of both practices simultaneously will likely increase the firm’s cost structure and diminish the effectiveness of VPD.
Similarly, though paying above-market wages or providing abovemarket benefits is likely to attract high-quality human capital, it is possible that this human capital would have been motivated to join the
firm at (or possibly below) market wages at the entry level, with the
promise of being able to compete for significantly higher rewards with
advancement in the firm. As noted above, VPD focuses on the relative
nature of compensation, rather than absolute compensation. Therefore, the emphasis tends to be placed on internal comparisons within
the tournament rather than external market comparisons. This emphasis on competition stands at odds with information-sharing practices and participation mechanisms aimed at producing collaboration
through the HPWS. Employees are essentially being pulled in two separate directions by the various elements of the control system, leading to suboptimal results.
Other elements of traditional models of motivation-enhancing HPWSs are likely to work against the vertical pay structure, as well. For
instance, pay plans that are based on profit sharing, team-based pay,
or gainsharing all operate on a basis of collaboration. These programs
enhance employee wages to the extent that the team, department, or
firm does well financially. Such programs can be useful under the right
context in motivating human capital to achieve high levels of performance, particularly through shared efforts. However, if these programs are implemented in conjunction with vertical pay dispersion,
the two attributes may work against each other. If some parties receive a larger share of the pie when profits or gains are shared, it may
be perceived as unfair by those lower in the hierarchy. This may lead
to a sense of inequity that undermines the intended collaboration of
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the HPWS. Similarly, if rewards are shared with all individuals in the
organization, it may contribute to a “free rider” effect, in which poor
performers receive pay increases for efforts they have not given. This
will likely be a disincentive to high performers, leading them to sort
out of the organization.
Further, it may be more economically efficient to offer a vertically
dispersed pay structure rather than both offering such a structure and
paying above market wages or providing above-market benefits. By
paying all employees significantly above the market rate, rather than
paying only those who “win” the corporate tournament higher rates,
the firm is increasing its overall cost structure. By combining high average wages with higher maximum wages, the firm places itself at a
competitive disadvantage relative to peers emphasizing only one or
the other. The results are a less efficient control system. This leads to
the following:
Hypothesis 3: Motivation-enhancing HPWSs will negatively
moderate the relationship between VPD and organizational performance, such that an increased emphasis on HPWSs dilutes the
effectiveness of VPD on firm performance.
Opportunity-enhancing practices are employee suggestion and
participation systems, job rotation, job autonomy, and communication
programs (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). As compared to motivation-enhancing and skill-enhancing HPWSs, we expect that opportunity-enhancing HPWSs will actually make vertical pay structures more
successful at improving firm performance. This is expected because
HPWSs enhance the number of opportunities available to employees
who are already incentivized to perform at a high level by the vertical
pay structure. The net effect is an increase in performance because
highly motivated workers are matched with opportunities.
A key tenet of tournament theory is that tournaments are successful at motivating performance only if contestants feel as if their investment of effort will directly influence their probability of advancing in the tournament (Connelly et al., 2014). Similar to the predictions
of expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), individuals will put forth optimal effort only if they believe that the increased effort will directly enhance their chance of “winning” the promotion. Therefore, we expect
that opportunity-enhancing HPWSs, which include such practices as
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job autonomy, communication, and participation (Jiang, Lepak, Hu,
& Baer, 2012) will work in concert with VPD by providing individuals with greater opportunities to display their skill relative to others
in the firm. Without the opportunity to participate, those involved in
corporate tournaments may feel frustrated and will be less likely to
put forth the effort necessary to “win,” as they sense that winning is
based on factors unrelated to job performance.
Further, opportunity-enhancing HPWSs tend to focus more upon
unlocking intrinsic motivation rather than building extrinsic motivation (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012; Ryan & Deci, 2000). As such, these
practices are likely to work via different motivational cues than VPD,
which can be more fully linked to extrinsic motivation (Connelly et al.,
2014; Twenge, Campbell, Hoffman, & Lance, 2010). Assuming a multifaceted view of motivation (Reiss & Havercamp, 1998), which includes
elements of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, providing opportunity enhancement with a VPD may result in an optimal solution for
generating greater individual and organizational performance. This
leads to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 4: Opportunity-enhancing HPWSs positively moderate the relationship between VPD and organizational performance such that an increased emphasis on HPWSs enhances the
effectiveness of VPD on firm performance.
In sum, we expect that HPWSs overall will undermine the effectiveness of vertical pay dispersion. We expect this to also hold in regard to
skill-enhancing and motivation-enhancing practices, but expect that
opportunity-enhancing practices will positively moderate the relationship. These relationships are summarized in Figure 1.
3 METHOD
3.1 Sample
To test the proposed hypotheses, we analyze a panel data set of firms
in South Korea. Four waves of panel surveys were biennially collected
during 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011 by the Korea Research Institute for
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Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET) in cooperation with the
Ministry of Labor in South Korea. KRIVET created the initial sampling
frame, which included all South Korean firms with more than 100 employees and for whom accounting performance data was available from
the Korean Information Service. The initial sampling pool had 454, 467,
473, and 500 firms in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011, respectively. In each
organization, both organizational-level surveys and employee-level surveys were administered. Human resources managers and strategic planning managers rated organizational-level survey items. For the employee-level survey, 13,101 employees in 2005, 11,473 employees in
2007, 10,019 employees in 2009, and 10,064 employees in 2011 were
randomly selected at each wave from different hierarchical levels (e.g.,
rank-and-file employees, assistant managers, and executives) and diverse functional areas (e.g., marketing, finance, and management).2
We combined the employee-level data with organizational-level
data because some variables in our study are measured by aggregating individual employees’ responses. Additionally, as common method
bias may influence the validity of findings (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee,
& Podsakoff, 2003), we merged the combined data set (organizational
and individual data) with archival financial performance data available
from the Korea Information Services.
While the four-waves of panel data contain a total of 832 firms after dropping observations with missing data, for the present study we
used firms from which more than five top managers participated in
the survey. We used five top managers as the criterion based on past
research (Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers, 2016). Our
final sample is a panel of 233 firms and 8,328 employees. This is an
unbalanced panel data set that consists of 60 firms and 2,427 employees (on average 40.5 employees in each firm) in 2005, 54 firms and
1,827 employees (on average 33.8 employees in each firm) in 2007, 58
firms and 1,913 employees (on average 33.0 employees in each firm)
in 2009, and 61 firms and 2,161 employees (on average 35.4 employees in each firm) in 2011.
3.2 Measures
All the predictors are measured at four time points, 2004, 2006, 2008,
and 2010.
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3.2.1 Independent variable: Vertical pay dispersion
We followed Connelly et al. (2016)’s operationalization of VPD to
measure vertical pay dispersion (VPD). Connelly et al. (2016) operationalized top management-to-worker pay dispersion as the average
top management team (TMT) total compensation (numerator) divided
by the average non-TMT employees’ compensation (denominator). In
this study, we broadly defined top management as department heads
and executives. We obtained the average TMT total compensation for
each firm by averaging department heads’ and executives’ total compensation for each firm (numerator). On average, our sample contains
7.61 top managers from each firm. To obtain average non-TMT employees’ compensation (denominator), we first calculated the firm’s
total labor expenses from each firm’s annual report; we summed the
employees’ salary (including TMT), incentives, and allowances. From
the total labor expenses, we subtracted the total compensation for
the TMT, which was calculated by multiplying the average TMT total
compensation and the number of TMT. The total labor expenses excluding TMT were then divided by the number of employees (i.e., average non-TMT employees’ compensation). We divided the average
TMT total compensation (numerator) by the average non-TMT employees’ compensation (denominator) and standardized it to measure a firm’s VPD.
3.2.2 Moderation variable: HPWS
For the operationalization of HPWS index, we followed Shaw, Park,
and Kim (2013) and measured selection ratio, training investment, pay
level, benefit level, and communication. We measured the selection
ratio by dividing the total number of new hires by the total number
of applicants (Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998). We measured
training investment by dividing the total training expenses (for collective inside- and outside-the-company trainings) by the number of
full-time employees (Sung & Choi, 2014). Following Shaw et al. (2013),
we measured benefit level as the average annual benefit level for fulltime employees. Pay level was similarly operationalized as the average annual salary level for full-time employees. To measure the communication system, we averaged the three items used in Shaw et al.
(2013) (α = 0.76 in 2005; α = 0.75 in 2007; α = 0.80 in 2009; α = 0.82
in 2011). Example item includes “our company shares organization
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information with all employees through managers or company-wide
communication systems.” Employees assessed the three items using
a 5-point Likert-type scale. We aggregated the communication scores
to the organizational level; rwg were 0.91 in 2005, 0.92 in 2007, 0.91 in
2009, and 0.91 in 2011. ICC(1) and ICC(2) were, respectively, 0.15 and
0.87 in 2005, 0.17 and 0.87 in 2007, 0.19 and 0.88 in 2009, and 0.19
and 0.89 in 2011. Overall, aggregation of employee responses at the
firm level is supported.
To measure motivation-enhancing and opportunity-enhancing HPWSs more broadly, we included performance evaluation, pay for performance, employee suggestion, job rotation, job autonomy, and employee participation in decision making in our HPWS index. Human
resource managers in each organization reported if the organization
had completed employee evaluations; the balanced scorecard, competency evaluation, multisource evaluation, and performance feedback (1 = yes, 0 = no). We averaged these four evaluation practices
to create the performance evaluation measure. Pay for performance
was measured in the same way. We averaged four dummy variables
(1 = yes, 0 = no), which indicates the presence or absence of the following four pay-for-performance practices: team-based incentives,
department-based incentives, gain sharing, and stock options.
For employee suggestion programs, we used a dichotomous variable that indicates whether employee suggestion systems had been
administered in the organization. This was rated by human resource
managers in each organization (1 = yes; 0 = no). We used a dummy
variable that indicates the presence or absence of a job rotation practice in each organization. This was also rated by human resource managers (1 = yes; 0 = no). We used aggregation of employees’ ratings
for job autonomy and participation in decision making. Employees
in each organization assessed the extent to which employees in their
work teams actively participated in decision making and problem solving using a 5-point Likert-type scale. We aggregated these individual responses to produce a participation in decision making measure
at the organizational level. We examined the appropriateness of aggregation using such aggregation statistics as r wg (James, Demaree,
& Wolf, 1993) and intraclass correlation [ICC(1) and ICC(2)]. r wg were
0.83 in 2005, 0.84 in 2007, 0.83 in 2009, and 0.82 in 2011. ICC(1) and
ICC(2) were, respectively, 0.02 and 0.14 in 2005, 0.11 and 0.50 in 2007,
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0.21 and 0.68 in 2009, and 0.11 and 0.46 in 2011. These aggregation
statistics indicate that there is a significant difference between organizations and high reliability among employees. Job autonomy was
measured in the same way. Employees rated the extent to which they
have job autonomy in doing their work using a 5-point Likert-type
scale. We aggregated the job autonomy scores to the organizational
level for our analysis. rwg were 0.79 in 2005, 0.74 in 2007, 0.77 in 2009,
and 0.80 in 2011. ICC(1) and ICC(2) were, respectively, 0.03 and 0.23
in 2005, 0.10 and 0.47 in 2007, 0.14 and 0.55 in 2009, and 0.18 and
0.60 in 2011. These ICC statistics justify the aggregation.
We utilized a formative measurement of the HPWS index based
on the criteria outlined in MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Jarvis (2005).
We utilize this approach for three specific reasons. First, the sum of
HR practices defines manifestations of the HPWS rather than being
defined by it. Second, different HR practices represent a unique aspect of the HPWS, and thus are not interchangeable. This suggests HR
practices do not systematically co-vary. Third, in spite of some commonalities, each HR practice may have different/unique antecedents
and outcomes (Jiang, Lepak, Han, Hong, Kim, & Winkler, 2012). Meeting all the criteria, in this study, HR practices as indicators are viewed
as combining to cause the latent construct, HPWS, rather than being
caused by it (MacCallum & Browne, 1993). Therefore, the HPWS index
is a formative measure. Reliability assessments such as coefficient alpha are not appropriate for a formative measure, as its indicators are
not expected to co-vary (Bollen & Lennox, 1991; Diamantopoulos &
Siguaw, 2006; MacKenzie et al., 2005).
Following previous studies (e.g., Shaw, Dineen, Fang, & Vellella,
2009; Wright et al., 2005), we standardized the 11 HR practices and
created an additive index of HPWS. Additionally, we categorized the
11 HR practices into three dimensions of HPWS to create skill-enhancing, motivation-enhancing, and opportunity-enhancing HPWSs based
on the work by Jiang, Lepak, Hu, and Baer (2012).
3.2.3 Dependent variable: Organizational performance
For the dependent variable, we used four financial performance
measures, which are widely used in the strategic management literature (e.g., Hoskisson, 1987; Roberts & Dowling, 2002): return on assets (ROA), firm profitability, net income, and workforce productivity.
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To establish better causal ordering of relationships, we included past
organizational performance measured at T as a control variable. The
past performance measures vary depending on the dependent variables used in the analysis model. For example, when ROA measured
at T + 1 was used as a dependent variable, ROA at T was controlled.
We measured ROA by dividing after-tax profit (or net profit) by
total assets (Roberts & Dowling, (2002). Following Mehra (1996), we
measured firm profitability as net profit per employee. Because of the
skewness of the distribution, firm profitability was logged. ShapiroWilk W statistic showed that the sampling distribution after the transformation approached normality (W = .99, ns) (Royston, 1982; Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). We adopted a one-year lag into our performance
measures to examine how predictors in year T influenced organizational performance in T + 1.
In our robustness checks, we used an organization’s net income
and workforce productivity as dependent variables. Workforce productivity was measured as total sales per employee (Shaw et al., 2013).
Workforce productivity was logged due to the skewed distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk W statistic supported the transformation, indicating that
the sampling distribution approached normality (W = .98, p < .01)
(Royston, 1982; Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). Ratio measures as dependent
variables may confound the estimated relationships with independent
variables because independent variables may be associated with both
the numerator and the denominator of the ratio measures (e.g., Barnett & Salomon, 2012). Therefore, we complemented the above dependent measures with an unscaled measure of organizational performance. Following Barnett and Salomon (2012), we used net income as
a non-ratio measure of organizational performance. Because the measure was skewed, we used the natural log of net income. The transformation was supported by the Shapiro-Wilk W statistic (W = .99, ns)
(Royston, 1982; Shapiro & Wilk, 1965).
3.2.4 Control variables
We included several control variables that are relevant to our research model. We controlled for organizational age (the number of
years since the founding year) and size (log of the number of full
time employees) as older and larger organizations are more likely
to employ better developed HR practices than smaller organizations
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(Guthrie, 2001). Organizational human capital is positively associated
with both HPWSs and organizational performance (e.g., Jiang, Lepak,
Hu, & Baer, 2012). Therefore, we controlled for the average employee
educational level (Black & Lynch, 1996). We included a weighted average of organizational educational level (1 = less than high school
diploma; 2 = two-year college degree; 3 = four-year college degree;
4 = master’s degree; 5 = doctoral degree), in the analysis.
We controlled for a firm’s strategic orientation in the industry because it may influence the implementation of HPWS as well as firm
performance. The strategic planning manager in each organization
rated the firm’s strategic orientation, whether it behaves most like a
prospector, analyzer, or defender in the industry in each year (Miles &
Snow, 1978). A detailed definition for each term was provided in the
survey. With defender as a reference group, we created two dummies
(prospector and analyzer) and included them in the analysis.
Finally, we controlled for industry effects and year effects by including industry dummies and year dummies. Measurement invariance testing was also completed prior to analyzing the data as a
prerequisite for correctly interpreting the results from a longitudinal
sample (Finkel, 1995). We adapted the procedure suggested by Diamantopoulos and Papadopoulos (2010); we used year as a grouping
variable. The invariance tests confirmed that the HPWS index is structural, slope, and residual invariant across the 2005, 2007, 2009, and
2011 panels. The results are not reported herein to conserve space
but are available from the authors upon request.
3.3 Analytical strategy
The sampling frame includes organizations from which at least five
TMT members participated in the survey. Although the necessity can
be well justified, this may cause a sample selection problem because
sample selection bias generally occurs when observations are not randomly selected (Greene, 2008; Heckman, 1979). To address the potential bias, we conducted a two-stage Heckman correction procedure
(Heckman, 1979). In Stage 1, a probit model predicting the likelihood
of being included in the final sample (i.e., more than five TMT members participated in the survey) was used with organizational age, organizational size, HPWS, trust, past performance, and industry and
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year dummies as independent variables. Based on the result of the
probit model, the inverse Mills ratio was calculated (Greene, 2008).
This correction was included as a control variable in the second stage
analysis (Heckman, 1979), but the inverse Mills ratio was not significant. The analysis results showed no evidence of sample selection bias.
Therefore, following Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), and Pathak,
Hoskisson, and Johnson (2014), we excluded the inverse Mills ratio
from the following analysis models to preserve degrees of freedom.
4 Results
Descriptive statistics of our study variables and their intercorrelations
are presented in Table I. Tables 2 and 3 show the hierarchical regression analysis results.
Hypothesis 1 postulated that HPWSs negatively moderate the relationship between VPD and organizational performance. As Tables 2
and 3 show, the interaction between VPD and HPWS was negative and
significant with respect to ROA (Model 4: b = –2.43, SE = .95, p < .05)
and firm profitability (Model 10: b = –.17, SE = .09, p < .10). Following
the suggestion by Aiken and West (1991), we plotted the interaction
effect of HPWSs and VPD with one standard deviation above and below the means of variables. As Figure 2(a) and Figure 3(a) show, the
effect of VPD on organizational performance is positive for low HPWS
but negative for high HPWS. We further examined the simple slopes
of each plot (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). The simple slopes tests
showed that the effect of VPD for high HPWS was significant for ROA
(b = –1.59, SE = .65, p < .05) and firm profitability (b = –.18, SE = .06,
p < .01). The effect of VPD for low HPWS was significant for ROA (b
= 3.27, SE = 1.33, p < .05) but not for firm profitability (b = .16, SE =
0.13, ns). In general, Hypothesis 1 was supported.
Hypothesis 2 proposed that skill-enhancing HPWS negatively
moderates the relationship between VPD and organizational performance. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the interaction between VPD and
skill-enhancing HPWSs was negative and significant with respect to
ROA (Model 6: b = –17.39, SE = 4.82, p < .01) and firm profitability
(Model 12: b = –1.19, SE = .48, p < .05). Following the same procedure,
we plotted the interaction effect of VPD and skill-enhancing HPWS
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on organizational performance in Figures 2 and 3. The plots consistently indicate that the effect of VPD on firm performance is negative
for high-skill-enhancing HPWS but positive for low-skill-enhancing
HPWS. Simple slopes tests results supported our interpretation. The
effect of VPD for high-skill-enhancing HPWS was negative and significant for ROA (b = –13.69, SE = 4.23, p < .01) and firm profitability (b
= –1.02, SE = .42, p < .05). The effect of VPD for low-skill- enhancing
HPWSs, however, was positive and significant in predicting ROA (b =
21.09, SE = 5.47, p < .01) and firm profitability (b = 1.35, SE = .55, p <
.05). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported.
Hypothesis 3 postulated that motivation-enhancing HPWS negatively moderates the relationship between VPD and organizational
performance. Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the interaction between VPD
and motivation-enhancing HPWS was negative and significant in predicting ROA (Model 6: b = –18.15, SE = 4.37, p < .01) and firm profitability (Model 12: b = –1.05, SE = .43, p < .05). The interactive effects
of VPD and motivation-enhancing HPWS are presented in Figures 2
and 3. Consistent with our expectation, the plots show that the effect
of VPD on firm performance depends on the level of motivation-enhancing HPWS. Simple slopes tests show that the effect of VPD for
high-motivation-enhancing HPWS was negative and significant with
regard to ROA (b = –14.45, SE = 3.68, p < .01) and firm profitability (b
= –.89, SE = .36, p < .05). Simple slopes tests also show that the effect of VPD for low-motivation-enhancing HPWSs was positive and
significant with regard to ROA (b = 21.85, SE = 5.10, p < .01) and firm
profitability (b = 1.22, SE = .50, p < .05). Hypothesis 3 was supported.
Hypothesis 4 proposed that opportunity-enhancing HPWSs positively moderate the relationship between VPD and organizational performance. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the interaction between VPD
and opportunity-enhancing HPWSs was positively significant in predicting ROA (Model 6: b = 15.86, SE = 4.37, p < .01) and firm profitability (Model 12: b = .94, SE = .43, p < .05). Consistent with our expectation, the interactive effects of VPD and opportunity-enhancing
HPWSs presented in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that the effect of VPD on
firm performance is positive for high-opportunity-enhancing HPWSs
but negative for low-opportunity-enhancing HPWSs. We further performed simple slopes tests. The effect of VPD for high-opportunityenhancing HPWS was positive and significant with respect to ROA (b
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= 19.56, SE = 5.05, p < .01) and firm profitability (b = 1.10, SE = 0.50,
p < .05). However, the effect of VPD for low-opportunity-enhancing
HPWS was negative and significant in predicting ROA (b = –12.16, SE
= 3.76, p < .01) and firm profitability (b = –.78, SE = .37, p < .05). Thus,
Hypothesis 4 was supported. We obtained similar results with workforce productivity and net income as criterion variables.
4.1 Robustness checks
4.1.1 Quality of management
While the analysis results provided consistent support for our hypotheses across various performance measures, they cannot completely rule out alternative explanations. Quality of management could
be a critical alternative explanation for the relationships. High-quality management influences the designs of both HPWSs and VPD as
well as firm performance. This raises an endogeneity concern for our
findings. While controlling for past performance, which captures the
nature of management quality, reduced some concern, we reran the
analysis models with the measure of management quality controlled.
Quality of management was measured by using the following four
items (α = .73 in 2005; α = .71 in 2007; α = .74 in 2009; α = .74 in
2011), which were rated by individual employees in each firm using a
5-point Likert-type scale: the extent to which the firm retains talented
employees, values talented employees, informs employees of firm’s
situation in detail, and is being run by effective leadership. We aggregated the individual-level measure to obtain the organizational-level
management quality (ICC(1) = 0.19, ICC(2) = 0.90 in 2005; ICC(1) =
0.18, ICC(2) = 0.88 in 2007; ICC(1) = 0.19, ICC(2) = 0.89 in 2009; ICC(1)
= 0.20, ICC(2) = 0.90 in 2011).
The analysis results with management quality controlled also supported our hypotheses. The interaction between VPD and HPWSs was
significantly associated with ROA (b = –2.34, SE = .96, p < .05). The interactions of VPD with skill-enhancing HPWSs (b = –17.27, SE = 4.82,
p < .01), with motivation-enhancing HPWS (b = –18.07, SE = 4.38, p <
.01), and with opportunity-enhancing HPWS (b = 15.84, SE = 4.38, p
< .01) also significantly predicted ROA. Consistent results were found
for firm profitability.
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4.1.2 Incentive effect of VPD
Essential to our theoretical argument is that VPD plays a role to incentivize employees. However, the differences in human capital among
employees, specifically between workers and the management team,
can increase VPD, and the proportion of VPD based on this legitimate
reason may be less relevant to the incentive role. Thus, we reran the
analysis models controlling for the variance of human capital within
firm; the higher the variance of human capital, the higher VPD is. As
educational level is one of the most widely used proxies for human
capital, we used individual employees’ educational level to calculate
the variance of employees’ educational level for each firm. The educational level of all the employees was provided by human resources
managers in each firm. Controlling for the variance of human capital
allowed us to more clearly examine the incentive effect of VPD.
The results supported our hypotheses, as well. VPD–HPWS interaction significantly predicted ROA (b = –2.42, SE = 0.95, p < 0.05). Similarly, the interactions of VPD with skill-enhancing HPWSs (b = –17.24,
SE = 4.84, p < .01), with motivation-enhancing HPWSs (b = –18.09, SE
= 4.38, p < .01), and with opportunity-enhancing HPWS (b = 15.78,
SE = 4.38, p < .01) were significantly associated with ROA. Consistent
results were obtained with firm profitability.
5 Discussion
VPD and HPWSs offer competing logics for increasing performance
through human resources. Results suggest that skill-enhancing and
motivation-enhancing HPWS work to attenuate the efficacy of VPD,
while opportunity-enhancing HPWSs strengthen the relationship between VPD and various firm performance metrics. As such, the study
offers a number of useful insights for scholars and practitioners. First,
the implications of tournament theory and vertical pay dispersion
have been discussed at length in the economics and strategy literatures, but have seldom been examined in concert with other management practices. Given that systems are often at work simultaneously, organizations seeking to optimize the efforts of their employees
ought to carefully consider the implications of using both vertical pay
structures and HPWSs to manage employees.
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As opposed to a universalistic view of HPWS as nearly always being beneficial to organizational success (Pfeffer, 1998), the present
study supports a configurational approach (Lepak & Snell, 1999, 2002)
in which practices need to be considered as they relate to one another prior to implementation. If practices compete with one another
in terms of their motivational properties, then they might not be usefully configured within the same system. This study highlights the fact
that the link between vertical pay structures and performance is significantly weaker when skill- and motivation-enhancing high-performance work practices are leveraged. This is not necessarily because
these practices always compete, but may simply reflect the reality
that employee skill and ability may be maximized by less expensive
channels than those generally thought to accompany an HPWS. Offering disproportionately increasing monetary rewards may provide
enough incentive to attract and retain high-quality workers, without
the need to invest in additional practices. Additional analysis is necessary to continue to assess this possibility.
Second, this article offers a nuanced perspective of the relationship between HPWSs and VPD by decomposing the HPWS into skill-,
motivation-, and opportunity-enhancing elements. This was demonstrated to be an important test as the three subbundles were found
to relate differently to VPD. While skill- and motivation-enhancing
HPWSs diminished the effectiveness of VPD in firm performance, the
opportunity-enhancing HPWS seems to increase the effectiveness of
VPD. This was hypothesized and relates to the nature of opportunityenhancing HPWS. Those employees who choose to join organizations
with steep hierarchies are hungry for the opportunity to prove their
worth, particularly in relationship to others competing for similar promotions. As such, providing employees with participation mechanisms
and other opportunity-enhancing practices fits well with the aims of
the vertically deployed pay structure. High-potential employees join
the firm in the hope of gaining high levels of rewards and further benefit from having the opportunity to perform. Under such situations,
firms are more likely to optimize the use of human capital.
Third, this article is able to leverage a multiyear data source to test
the relationships longitudinally. While causation is not inferred, this
model helps to limit reverse causality and allows for the chronological
spacing of the independent and dependent variables. This represents
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an important contribution to the strategic HRM literature, which has
more frequently relied on cross-sectional designs rather than paneldata models.
Taking the findings of the study together offers a number of useful avenues for continued investigation. First, one potential avenue for
integrating VPD and HPWSs is via workforce differentiation. As advocated by Huselid and Becker (2010), workforce differentiation suggests that organizations may be served well to offer different models
of workforce management to different groups of employees within
the firm. Those that are more strategically important assets ought to
be managed differently than those with less strategic significance to
the firm. Lepak, Taylor, Tekleab, Marrone, and Cohen (2007) found
support for this idea in demonstrating that firms tend to utilize highinvolvement HR systems to a greater extent for “core” employees.
Building on these ideas, it would be worthwhile to investigate the
utilization of HPWs at higher levels of the organization and leveraging VPD for lower-level positions. Of course, this introduces a number of integration challenges, but provides an interesting avenue for
future investigation.
Future work may also examine the connections of VPD and HPWSs
given different levels of task interdependency, a known moderator of
the relationship between horizontal pay dispersion and performance
outcomes (Shaw et al., 2002). It may be that VPD is particularly powerful in highly autonomous work, which marginalizes the effectiveness of HPWSs. However, under situations of greater task interdependence, it may be that VPD and HPWSs work more closely together or
via similar channels. Future research ought to assess the joint effects
of HPWSs and VPD in task-interdependent environments to determine the nature of the relationship between the two constructs when
teamwork is necessitated.
Though tangential, this study further adds to the literature examining the effects of compensation on performance outcomes. The results of this study highlight the important motivational role that VPD
plays in producing performance outcomes. This supports the traditional sorting and incentive effects espoused by tournament theory
(Lazear & Rosen, 1981). However, this study does not examine other
unintended consequences of such practices like competition within
the firm, a lack of teamwork, or higher levels of turnover (Akerlof &
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Yellen, 1988; Ferraro et al., 2005; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). Future work
is necessary to determine if more egalitarian pay structures fit more
closely with HPWSs.
5.1 Practical Implications
The theoretical and empirical relationships discussed above have important practical implications for HR professionals. Most notably, the
paper continues to highlight the importance of viewing HR practices
from a systems approach. Understanding the ways in which compensation practices interface with the rest of the HR system is an important key to building effective systems. The study demonstrates the
importance of not working against purposes with the system itself to
ensure that the HR practices in place complement one another rather
than detract from one another. HR professionals are well served to
focus on intended outcomes and then devise a constellation of practices to achieve the desired outcomes. This stands in contrast to a best
practices model that assumes “more is better.” Considering the horizontal linkages is key to both minimizing costs and ensuring a return
from investments in the HR architecture.
In particular, firms appear to be well positioned when they pair
compensation practices that enhance motivation and sort high-quality candidates into the firm with opportunity-enhancing practices that
allow those individuals to showcase their talents. The firm may be
able to limit costs in other areas by offering competitive wage structures, but should be mindful of maximizing opportunity enhancement within the firm. At the same time firms that leverage high levels
of HPWS in seeking collaboration and commitment from employees
will likely be served by more egalitarian pay structures and flatter organizational structures.
The key takeaway message for practitioners is to understand the
desired outcomes of the HR system and tailor the system toward
those outcomes. A consultancy that relies significantly on the efforts
of individual employees may receive optimal results from a hierarchical pay structure that minimizes other HR systems. Such a firm will
likely be able to sort in high-quality applicants with less cost, incentivize performance through promotion and pay increases, and sort out
poor performers who do not advance in the corporate tournaments,
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without having to invest in costly training, development, and performance improvement practices. Such is the case in many consulting,
accounting, and law firms that rely on “up or out” partnership-based
business models.
Conversely, a firm that seeks to build a pool of committed human
resources that work collaboratively will likely be served best by offering a less hierarchical pay structure that emphasizes training and career development alongside participation, information sharing, and
more group or team-based pay practices, to ensure the firm’s human
capital remains knowledgeable and motivated to produce. Companies such as Whole Foods (Harasta & Hoffman, 2013), which deemphasize power distance and strive for fewer levels of hierarchy, are
likely better served by a full HPWS, rather than a reliance on a hierarchical pay structure.
The results may also have implications for smaller firms. While such
companies are likely to lack the resources to invest heavily in a full
system of HR practices, they may be able to achieve similar benefits
from a vertically dispersed pay structure. Such structures may be built
on incentives or other forms of “at risk” compensation, as to minimize
the risk held by the organization. If such systems are able to sort and
incentivize quality human capital, the results may be more economically efficient for smaller firms. Of course, additional analysis is necessary prior to implementing such practices.
5.2 Limitations
The results of the study should be considered in light of its limitations. First, the study utilizes a large archival data source, which limits
the ability to understand the microdynamics of the motivational elements of both VPD and HPWS. Such factors are inferred from existing theory, but are not measured directly. Similar to motivation, attitudinal variables such as organizational commitment (Meyer & Allen,
1991) and perceived organizational support (Eisenberger, Huntington,
Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986) may also be influenced by VPD and HPWS.
Though this is a common limitation in the field of strategic human
resource management, future research should directly examine how
a simultaneous utilization of VPD and HPWS influences employees’
work motivation and work attitudes, which, in turn, contribute to firm
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performance. Further, many of the reported measures are subjectively
assessed, particularly the measures for HPWS. Many firms experience
significant differences in perceptions of the practices they claim and
those they actually implement (Liao, Toya, Lepak, & Hong, 2009). It
was not possible for us to measure the actual versus the intended use
of such practices, which limits the conclusions that can be drawn from
the study. Further related to the measurement of total employment
value under efficiency wage theory, based on the broader HPWS literature, we use payroll as a proxy for efficiency wage. Efficiency wage
requires separation of total employment value from total compensation. While in the strategic HRM literature it is common to use employees’ annual salary as a proxy for efficiency wage, such measurements remain a limitation of this study.
We acknowledge that the generalizability of the findings may be
limited to South Korea, a culture that is considerably different from
the United States. While the United States is an individualistic culture,
South Korea is a collectivistic culture. In an individualistic culture, personal interests are of the most importance, but in a collectivistic culture, the cooperation among individuals is emphasized, and group
interests take precedence over individual interests or needs (Wagner,
1995). This unique context may enlarge the detrimental effect of VPD
when it is utilized with HPWSs because VPD encourages competition
among employees. Future research could endeavor to address the
generalizability of our findings. In addition, while several control variables were included in the regressions, including controls for past performance, there still could be the possibility of omitted variable bias.
When a variable that influences both predictors and the dependent
variable is excluded from an analysis model, omitted variable bias occurs (Greene, 2008). We could not capture varying firm and employee
characteristics; however, estimates in a panel setting account for unobserved firm heterogeneity, and thus allows for more consistent and
reliable estimation.
5.3 Conclusion
While vertical pay dispersion and high-performance work systems
each offer motivational benefits to organizations, the underlying
mechanisms between such systems operate differently. As such,
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careful attention needs to be given to creating harmony between the
compensation practices of the firm and the constellation of other HRM
practices leveraged. The results from this study suggest that including
VPD and HPWSs simultaneously may lead to suboptimal outcomes,
particularly in regard to skill- and motivation-enhancing HPWSs. At
the same time, creating opportunities via the firm’s HR system appears to complement the principles of VPD to enhance performance.
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Figure 1. Contrasting VPD and HPWS

Figure 2. Interactive effect of vertical pay dispersion (VPD) and high-performance
work systems (HPWSs) on ROA
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Figure 3. Interactive effect of vertical pay dispersion (VPD) and high-performance work systems (HPWS) on firm profitability

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable

M

SD

1

2

1. Organizational age

29.79

19.00

2. Organizational size

2.90

0.51

3. Educational level of firm employees 2.26

0.56

–0.13*

–0.12

4. Analyzer

0.36

0.48

0.01

–0.12

5. Prospector

0.40

0.49

0.11

6. Vertical pay dispersion

0.00

1.00

–0.01

7. HPWS

0.00

1.00

0.05

8. Return on assets

7.36

4.87

–0.14*

9. Firm profitability

4.35

0.59

3

4

5

6

7

8

—
0.21**

0.19**

—
—
0.01

—

0.04

–0.61**

—

0.02

–0.05

–0.06

0.42**

0.04

–0.14*

0.26**

0.08

0.03

–0.13

0.05

–0.06

–0.15*

–0.06

0.13*

–0.16*

0.25**
–0.01

0.22**

N = 233. HPWS = high-performance work system; SD = standard deviation.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01

—
0.02

—
–0.02
0.26**

—
0.45**
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Table 2. Hierarchical regression results: interactive effect of vertical pay dispersion and HPWS on ROA
		

Dependent Variable: ROA (T + 1)

Predictors 		
		

Model 1
b.(SE)

Model 2
b.(SE)

Model 3
b.(SE)

Model 4
b.(SE)

Model 5
b.(SE)

Model 6
b.(SE)

Intercept		

0.46 (3.86)

0.46 (3.87)

0.55 (3.88)

0.54 (3.83)

0.02 (3.88)

0.28 (3.71)

Organizational age 		

–0.03 (0.02)

–0.03 (0.02)

–0.03 (0.02)

–0.03 (0.02)

–0.03 (0.02)

–0.03 (0.02)

Organizational size		

0.45 (0.64)

0.46 (0.64)

0.59 (0.71)

0.47 (0.70)

0.28 (0.74)

0.21 (0.70)

Educational level of firm employees		

–0.94 (0.83)

–0.95 (0.84)

–0.92 (0.84)

–0.98 (0.83)

–1.06 (0.84)

–0.90 (0.81)

Analyzer		

–0.20 (0.71)

–0.22 (0.72)

–0.22 (0.72)

–0.28 (0.71)

–0.16 (0.72)

0.18 (0.69)

Prospector		

0.41 (0.74)

0.39 (0.75)

0.40 (0.75)

0.47 (0.74)

0.32 (0.75)

0.66 (0.73)

Past firm performancea 		

0.55 (0.05)**

0.55 (0.05)**

0.55 (0.05)**

0.55 (0.05)**

0.56 (0.06)**

0.55 (0.05)**

Vertical pay dispersion (VPD) 			

–0.06 (0.26)

–0.06 (0.26)

0.84 (0.44)†

–0.05 (0.26)

3.70 (0.82)**

HPWS 				

–0.15 (0.33)

–0.24 (0.33)

[H1]				

–2.43 (0.95)*

Control variables

Independent variables

VPD × HPWS

Skill-enhancing HPWS 						

–0.31 (0.29) –1.55 (0.46)**

Motivation-enhancing HPWS						

0.34 (0.33)

–0.86 (0.44)†

Opportunity-enhancing HPWS						

–0.36 (0.31)

0.75 (0.42)†

VPD × Skill-enhancing HPWS

[H2] 						–17.39 (4.82)**

VPD × Motivation-enhancing HPWS

[H3]					

–18.15 (4.37)**

VPD × Opportunity-enhancing HPWS [H4]						 15.86 (4.37)**
Industry and year dummies		

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

F value 5.56**		

5.39**

5.24**

5.41**

5.09**

5.77**

R2 / Adjusted R2 		

0.52 / 0.43

0.52 / 0.42

0.52 / 0.42

0.54 / 0.44

0.53 / 0.43

N = 233
HPWS = high-performance work system
† p < .10 ; * p < .05 ; **p < .01
a. ROA measured at T was included.

Yes
0.58 / 0.48
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Table 3. Hierarchical regression results: Interactive effect of vertical pay dispersion and HPWS on firm profitability
Dependent Variable: Firm profitability (T + 1)
Predictors 		
		

Model 7
b.(SE)

Model 8
b.(SE)

Model 9
b.(SE)

Model 10
b.(SE)

Model 11
b.(SE)

Model 12
b.(SE)

Intercept 		

1.45 (0.47)**

1.49 (0.46)**

1.47 (0.46)**

1.41 (0.46)**

1.44 (0.47)**

1.38 (0.46)**

Organizational age 		

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

–0.00 (0.00)

Organizational size 		

–0.01 (0.06)

–0.01 (0.06)

0.02 (0.07)

0.01 (0.07)

0.01 (0.07)

0.00 (0.07)

Educational level of firm employees

0.07 (0.08)

0.06 (0.08)

0.06 (0.08)

0.06 (0.08)

0.06 (0.08)

0.06 (0.08)

Analyzer 		

0.00 (0.07)

–0.02 (0.07)

–0.02 (0.07)

–0.03 (0.07)

–0.02 (0.07)

–0.00 (0.07)

Prospector		

0.07 (0.07)

0.04 (0.07)

0.05 (0.07)

0.05 (0.07)

0.05 (0.07)

0.06 (0.07)

Past firm performancea 		

0.69 (0.06)**

0.68 (0.05)**

0.69 (0.06)**

0.70 (0.06)**

0.69 (0.06)**

0.71 (0.06)**

Vertical pay dispersion (VPD) 			 –0.07 (0.03)** –0.07 (0.02)**

–0.01 (0.04) –0.07 (0.03)**

0.16 (0.08)*

HPWS 				

–0.04 (0.03)

–0.04 (0.03)

[H1] 				

–0.17 (0.09)†

Control variables

Independent variables

VPD × HPWS

Skill-enhancing HPWS 						

–0.03 (0.03)

–0.11 (0.05)*

Motivation-enhancing HPWS 						

–0.01 (0.03)

–0.07 (0.04)†

Opportunity-enhancing HPWS						

–0.03 (0.03)

0.03 (0.04)

VPD × Skill-enhancing HPWS

[H2] 						

–1.19 (0.48)*

VPD × Motivation-enhancing HPWS

[H3] 						

–1.05 (0.43)*

VPD × Opportunity-enhancing HPWS

[H4] 						

0.94 (0.43)*

Industry and year dummies 		

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

F value		

11.49**

11.83**

11.58**

11.51**

10.96**

10.80**

R2 / Adjusted R2 		

0.69 / 0.63

0.71 / 0.65

0.71 / 0.65

0.71 / 0.65

0.71 / 0.64

0.72 / 0.66

N = 233
HPWS = high-performance work system
† p < .10 ; * p < .05 ; ** p < .01
a. Firm profitability measured at T was included.

Notes
1. We would like to thank the observations of an anonymous reviewer for bringing this attribute to our attention.
2. More details on sampling frame and survey procedures are available at http://
eng.krivet.re.kr/eu/eh/prg_euGBADs.jsp
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